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Everyday speech has many terms that describe the drive for immediate rewards. We say
that consumers seek ‘instant gratiﬁcation’ and ‘immediate gratiﬁcation’; that they ‘live only
for the moment’; or that they ‘want it now.’
Robert Strotz (1956) was the ﬁrst to model instant gratiﬁcation mathematically. He
pointed out that two ingredients are essential to a successful theory. First, the discount
function should depend on the diﬀerence between the current time and the future time at
which the discounted reward is consumed. Second, the discount function should not be
exponential.1 He went on to conjecture that empirical discount rates would decrease with
t h et i m eh o r i z o n . 2 In other words, delaying current consumption by one period produces
proportionately more devaluation than delaying future consumption by one period. Most
experimental studies of time preference have supported Strotz’s conjecture (Ainslie 1992,
Loewenstein and Read 2001), although debate continues about the shape and even the
existence of a single discount function (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002).
To parameterize these discounting properties and the taste for instant gratiﬁcation, Laib-
son (1997a) adopted the discrete-time discount function {1,βδ,βδ
2,βδ
3,...} –w h i c hP h e l p s
and Pollak (1968) had previously used to model intergenerational time preferences. With
β<1, this so called ‘quasi-hyperbolic’ discount function generates a gap between a high
short-run discount rate and a low long-run rate. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b)
call these ‘present-biased’ time preferences, emphasizing the heightened weight they place
on current consumption. In the last several years, the quasi-hyperbolic discount function
has been used to study a wide range of behaviors, including consumption, procrastination,
addiction and job search.3
The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model has at least three signiﬁcant drawbacks. First,
it generates multiple equilibria, raising questions about its empirical usefulness.4 Am o d e l
that cannot be pinned down to a single equilibrium prediction is hard to falsify. Second,
it generates counterfactual policy functions. Consumption functions in quasi-hyperbolic
1Strotz (1956, p. 165 and Section V).
2Strotz (1956, p. 177) states that special attention should be given to discount functions that depart from
the exponential case by overvaluing "the more proximate satisfactions relative to the more distant ones".
Moreover footnote 1 on the same page makes clear that this statement applies to discount rates. Figure 3
on p. 175 is misleading. (It depicts a discount function for which discount rates are initially increasing in
t h et i m ed i ﬀerence.)
3For some examples, see Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman and Weinberg (2001), O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a, 1999b), Della Vigna and Paserman (2000), DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004).
4See Krusell and Smith (2000) for a proof of non-uniqueness.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 3
models need not be globally monotonic in wealth, and may even drop discontinuously at a
countable number of points.5 Figure 1 plots examples of such ‘pathological’ consumption
functions from discrete-time models. Third, it does not generate an obvious welfare criterion,
since diﬀerent selves have conﬂicting preferences.
The current paper shows how to model the taste for instant gratiﬁcation in continuous
time, and shows that the continuous-time model has a natural limit case that eliminates all
o ft h ep r o b l e m ss u m m a r i z e da b o v e . 6
The general version of our continuous-time model captures the qualitative properties of
the original discrete-time quasi-hyperbolic model. It makes a clear distinction between the
‘present’ and the ‘future’, a psychological contrast supported by recent fMRI brain-imaging
evidence.7 We assume that the present is valued discretely more than the future, mirroring
the one-time drop in valuation implied by the discrete-time quasi-hyperbolic discount func-
tion (Phelps and Pollak 1998, Laibson 1997) and its continuous-time generalizations (Barro
1999, Luttmer and Mariotti 2000). We also assume that the transition from the present to
the future is determined by a constant hazard rate. This simplifying assumption enables
us to reduce the Bellman equation for our problem to a system of two stationary ordinary
diﬀerential equations that characterize present and future value functions.
The limit version of our continuous-time model is derived by making the present vanish-
ingly short. This version is analytically tractable and psychologically relevant. By focusing
on this psychologically important case, we take the phrase ‘instant gratiﬁcation’ literally: in
our model, individuals prefer gratiﬁcation in the present instant discretely more than con-
sumption in the only slightly delayed future. Hence, the limit case reﬂects sharp short-run
discounting, a pattern of behavior that has been documented in laboratory experiments.8
We call the limit version of our model the instantaneous-gratiﬁcation model, or IG model
5See Laibson (1997b), Morris and Postlewaite (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), Harris and Laibson
(2001b), and Krusell and Smith (2000).
6Two other solutions to the ﬁrst three of these problem have been proposed. First, Harris and Laibson
(2001b) point out that pathologies occur only in a limited region of the parameter space (notably when the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion lies well below unity and when β is suﬃciently far below unity). Second,
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) point out that pathologies do not arise if consumers naively believe that their
preferences are dynamically consistent. However, even partial knowledge of future dynamic inconsistency
reinstates the pathologies.
7McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen (2004) ﬁnd that the limbic and para-limbic cortical systems
are activated when subjects evaluate immediate rewards and not when subjects evaluate delayed rewards.
This implies that the emotional/aﬀective (i.e., limbic) system only makes a distinction between present and
future rewards, instead of showing a gradual gradient with respect to time delay.































*These consumption functions are taken from discrete time simulations in Harris and Laibson (2001b).  These simulations assume iid income, a risk-free asset, and CRRA.                        
The short-run discount factor is bd.  The long-run discount factor is d=.95.  The plotted consumption functions are shifted upward (in increments of .1) so they do not overlap. 
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for short. We show that the IG model, which is dynamically inconsistent,s h a r e st h es a m e
value function as a related dynamically-consistent optimization problem with a wealth-
contingent utility function. Using this partial equivalence, we can show both existence and
uniqueness of the IG equilibrium. However, our model is not observationally equivalent to
the related dynamically consistent optimization problem: the partial equivalence applies to
the value functions but not to the policy functions.
We also show that the equilibrium consumption function of the IG model is continuous
and monotonic in wealth. The monotonicity property relies on the condition that the long-
run discount rate is weakly greater than the interest rate.
The IG model has these superior regularity properties – i.e., well-behaved policy func-
tions and uniqueness of equilibrium – because the IG model carves out a special niche be-
tween dynamically-inconsistent models and dynamically-consistent models. The IG model
features dynamically-inconsistent behavior and rational expectations. So each moment the
individual acts strategically with regard to her future preferences. Nevertheless, the fact
that the IG value function coincides with the value function of a related dynamically consis-
tent optimization problem, implies that the IG problem inherits many standard regularity
properties.
The IG model also features a single welfare criterion even though the model generates
dynamically inconsistent behavioral choices. Because the present is valued discretely more
than the future, the current self has an incentive to overconsume; but the discretely higher
value of the present only lasts for an instant, so this overvaluation doesn’t aﬀect the wel-
fare criterion. Hence, the model simultaneously features a single welfare function and a
behavioral tendency toward overconsumption.
In summary, we argue that the continuous-time IG model is superior to the discrete-time
quasi-hyperbolic model. The IG model is more tractable, makes more sensible predictions,
supports a unique equilibrium, and identiﬁes a single, sensible welfare criterion.
Two other sets of authors have analyzed quasi-hyperbolic preferences in continuous time.
Barro (1999) analyzes the choices of quasi-hyperbolic agents with constant relative risk aver-
sion. He focuses on the general-equilibrium implications of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and
the ways in which quasi-hyperbolic economies may be observationally equivalent to expo-
nential economies. Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) analyze the choices of agents with arbitrary
discount functions, constant relative risk aversion, and stochastic asset returns. Luttmer-
Mariotti generalize Barro’s observational-equivalence result, but also identify particular en-
dowment processes for which the quasi-hyperbolic model has interesting new asset-pricingINSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 5
implications (e.g., an elevated equity premium). Luttmer and Mariotti work with general
discount functions and consider numerous special cases. They have identiﬁed some proper-
ties of the particular case in which the present is vanishingly short. However, their ﬁndings
do not overlap with ours.
Barro and Luttmer-Mariotti both restrict their analysis to linear policy rules. The ex-
istence of a linear equilibrium depends on special preference assumptions (constant relative
risk aversion) and market assumptions (e.g., no liquidity constraints). We do not make
restrictive assumptions of this kind: we work with a broad class of preferences; and we in-
troduce a market imperfection: liquidity constraints. We pursue these generalizations for
greater realism. Our problem does not admit a linear equilibrium. We have to contend with
the problems that arise in our general setting, but do not arise under the Barro/Luttmer-
Mariotti simplifying assumptions in either discrete or continuous time.
Our results also diﬀer from Barro and Luttmer-Mariotti in that we are able to prove
uniqueness of Markov equilibrium in the class of all policy rules. This is a desirable and
unexpected result, since the hyperbolic model is a dynamic game, and can therefore generate
non-uniqueness. Indeed, Krusell and Smith (2000) have shown that quasi-hyperbolic Markov
equilibria are not unique in a deterministic discrete-time setting. In the current paper, we
provide two uniqueness results. First, we prove uniqueness in the case in which asset returns
are stochastic. Second, we propose a reﬁnement that uses the unique equilibrium of the
stochastic setting to select a unique sensible equilibrium in the deterministic setting. This
reﬁnement takes the natural approach of selecting the limiting equilibrium obtained as the
noise in the asset returns vanishes.
The rest of the paper formalizes these claims. In Section 2 we present our general
continuous-time model and formulate some of the properties of this model. In Section 3
we present the consumption model that will provide the principal application of the paper.
In Section 4 we describe an important limit case of our model. We call this limit case the
Instantaneous-Gratiﬁcation (IG) model. In Section 5 we show that the IG model has the
same Bellman equation as a related dynamically-consistent optimization problem. However,
note that the IG problem is not observationally equivalent to the dynamically-consistent
optimization problem. The two problems share the same long-run discount rate and the
same value function, but they have diﬀerent instantaneous utility functions and diﬀerent
equilibrium policy functions.9 In Section 7, we use our partial equivalence result to derive
9By contrast, see Barro (1999), Laibson (1996) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2000) for the special case
(namely log utility and no liquidity constraints) in which observational equivalence of the policy functionsINSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 6
several important properties of the IG problem, including equilibrium existence, equilibrium
uniqueness, consumption-function continuity, and consumption-function monotonicity. In
Section 7 we also derive the deterministic version of the IG model, and provide a complete
analysis of the case of constant relative risk aversion. In Section 8 we further generalize our
results, and in Section 9 we conclude.
2. Time Preferences
2.1. The Basic Model of Time Preferences. In the standard discrete-time formu-
lation of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences, it is natural to divide time into two intervals:
the present, which consists of the current period only; and the future, which consists of all
subsequent periods. All periods, present and future, are discounted exponentially with the
discount factor 0 <δ<1. Furthermore, future periods are discounted by the additional
factor 0 <β≤ 1. Overall, the present period is discounted with the discount factor 1,a n d
ap e r i o dn ≥ 1 steps into the future is discounted with the discount factor βδ
n (Phelps and
Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997).
This model can be generalized in two ways. First, instead of the present lasting for exactly
one period, it can last for an arbitrary length of time. Second, instead of the duration of
the present being deterministic, it can be random. Moreover the generalized model has a
natural continuous-time analogue.
Consider an economic self born at date s0. The preferences of this self are divided into
two intervals: a ‘present’, which lasts from s0 to s0 + τ0; and a ‘future’, which lasts from
date s0 + τ0 to ∞. Think of the present as the interval during which control is exercised
by the current self, and of the future as the interval during which control is exercised by
subsequent selves. The length τ0 of the present is stochastic, and is distributed exponentially
with parameter λ ∈ [0,∞).T h a ti s ,λ is the hazard rate of the transition from the present
to the future.
When the future of self s0 commences at s0 + τ0, a new self is born and takes control
of decision-making. Call this self s1 = s0 + τ0. The preferences of this new self can also
be divided into two intervals. Self s1 has a present that lasts from date s1 to date s1 + τ1,
and a future that lasts from s1 + τ1 to ∞. Extending this idea, we assume that at each
juncture of present and future a new self is born, yielding a sequence of selves born at dates
{s0,s 1,s 2,...}, with respective present intervals of duration {τ0,τ1,τ2,...}.
We assume that all selves discount exponentially with discount factor 0 <δ<1.F u r -
does hold.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 7
thermore, they value their future discretely less than their present, discounting their future
by the additional factor 0 <β ≤ 1. For example, consider the self that is born at date 0,
and which has a present of duration τ.B e c a u s e t h e t r a n s i t i o n d a t e τ is stochastic, self 0




t if t ∈ [0,τ)
βδ
t if t ∈ [τ,∞)
)
. (1)
D(t) decays exponentially at rate γ = −ln(δ) up to time τ, drops discontinuously at τ to a
fraction β of its level just prior to τ, and decays exponentially at rate γ thereafter. Hence,
self 0 discounts all ﬂows in her future – i.e., ﬂo w st h a tc o m ea f t e rt i m eτ –b yt h ee x t r a
factor β.
This example illustrates the intertemporal preferences of the self born at date 0. More
generally, the formula for D(t) in equation (1) represents the discount factor that self s
applies to utility ﬂows that arrive t periods in the future.
This continuous-time formalization is close to some of the deterministic discount functions
used in Barro (1999) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003). However, we assume that τ is
stochastic. Figure 2 plots a single realization of this discount function, with τ =3 .4.




t for all t ∈ [0,∞).
As λ →∞ , the discount function converges to a deterministic jump function with a jump





1 if t =0
βδ
t if t ∈ (0,∞)
)
.
We shall return to the latter case below.
2.2. An Alternative Model of Time Preferences. The arguments in this paper are
consistent with a second interpretation of the time preferences described above. In particu-
lar, one can assume that a new self is born every instant, and that each self has a deterministic
discount function equal to the expected value of the stochastic discount function described
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In other words, D(t) is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst term is the probability e−λt with
which the drop in D occurs after time t, times the discount factor e−γt that applies prior
to the drop. The second term is the probability 1 − e−λt with which the drop in D occurs
before time t, times the discount factor βe −γt that applies after the drop.








λe −λt (1 − β) e−γt
D(t)
.
In other words, the instantaneous discount rate is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst term is
just the long-run (exponential) discount rate γ. The second term is the ratio of the expected
drop in D at time t to the level of D at time t. Indeed: λe −λt is the ﬂow probability with
which the drop in D occurs at time t;a n d(1 − β) e−γt is the size of the drop in D if the
drop occurs at t.
Notice that the instantaneous discount rate decreases from γ + λ (1 − β) at t =0to γ
at t = ∞.F i g u r e3p l o t sD(t) for λ ∈ {0,0.1,1,10,∞}.
2.3. Comparison of the Two Models. At ﬁr s ts i g h t ,t h eb a s i ca n da l t e r n a t i v em o d e l s
described in subsections 2.1 and 2.2 are quite distinct. After all, the basic model uses a sto-
c h a s t i cd i s c o u n tf u n c t i o nw i t hap r e s e n to fn o n - i n ﬁnitesimal duration τ, while the alternative
model uses a deterministic discount function with a present of inﬁnitesimal duration dt.T h e
basic model involves a countable number of non-inﬁnitesimal selves, while the alternative
model involves a continuum of inﬁnitesimal selves. The two models are, however, equivalent.
To see why, note that the current self s in the basic model is dynamically consistent.
It therefore makes no diﬀerence whether we regard her as a single non-inﬁnitesimal agent,
which decides once and for all at the outset of the interval [s,s + τ) how it will behave
throughout this interval, or whether we regard her as a continuum of inﬁnitesimal agents,
each of which decides how it will behave at the instant t ∈ [s,s + τ) at which it acts.
Moreover, if we regard the current self as a continuum of inﬁnitesimal agents, and if we
assume that τ is independent of the other stochastic elements of the model, then we can take
expectations conditional on those other stochastic elements to conclude that the preferences
of the inﬁnitesimal agents of the non-inﬁnitesimal selves of the basic model coincide with
the preferences of the inﬁnitesimal selves of the alternative model.
The basic model has two advantages over the alternative model. First, it can be set up







Figure 3: Expected value of discount function for l Î {0,0.1,1,10,¥}
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t a k eo n el i m i t ,n a m e l yt h a to b t a i n e da sλ goes to inﬁnity. In doing so, we simultaneously
pass from non-inﬁnitesimal to inﬁnitesimal selves and from the ﬁnite-λ discount function to
the inﬁnite-λ discount function that is the ultimate focus of the paper. By contrast, in order
to set up the alternative model, we would ﬁrst have to formalize the idea of an inﬁnitesimal
self. This would involve taking the limit as the span of control of a non-inﬁnitesimal self
goes to zero. We would then have to let λ go to inﬁnity, in order to pass from the ﬁnite-λ
discount function to the inﬁnite-λ discount function.
We therefore focus on the basic model in this paper. It should, however, be borne in
mind that the alternative model is ultimately the more general model.
3. A Continuous-Time Consumption Model
Two important qualitative features of consumers’ planning problems are liquidity constraints
and labor-income uncertainty. Cf. Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992, 1997). We include
liquidity constraints in our consumption model, since they make an important diﬀerence to
the analysis. We exclude labor-income uncertainty, since it complicates the notation and
does not aﬀect our conclusions.
3.1. The Dynamics. At any given point in time t ∈ [0,∞), the consumer has stock
of wealth x ∈ [0,∞) and receives a ﬂow of labor income y ∈ (0,∞).I f x>0 then the
consumer is not liquidity constrained, and she may choose any consumption level c ∈ (0,∞).
Indeed, wealth is a stock and consumption is a ﬂow. Any ﬁnite consumption level is therefore
achievable provided that it is not maintained for too long. If x =0then the consumer is
liquidity constrained, and she may only choose a consumption level c ∈ (0,y]. Indeed, she
h a sn ow e a l t ha n ds h ec a n n o tb o r r o w .S h ec a n n o tt h e r e f o r ec o n s u m em o r et h a nh e rl a b o r
income.
Whatever the consumer does not consume is invested in an asset, the returns on which are
distributed normally with mean µdtand variance σ2 dt,w h e r eµ ∈ (−∞,∞) and σ ∈ (0,∞).
T h ec h a n g ei nh e rw e a l t ha tt i m et is therefore
dx =( µx+ y − c)dt + σxd z,
where z is a standard Wiener process.
We could easily generalize this framework by adding a stochastic source of labor income.
For example, we could assume that – in addition to her basic ﬂow of labor income y –t h e
agent sporadically receives lump-sum bonuses. To preserve stationarity, such bonuses wouldINSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 10
need to arrive with a constant hazard rate and be drawn from a ﬁxed distribution. We could
even allow for non-stationary labor income, at the expense of an extra state variable. We
do not pursue these generalizations, since they would not qualitatively change the analysis
that follows.
3.2. Preferences. As discussed above, the consumer is modeled as a sequence of au-
tonomous selves. Each self controls consumption in the present and cares about – but does
not directly control – consumption in the future. Now suppose that c :[ 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) is a
stationary consumption function which takes wealth as its argument; let x :[ s,∞) → [0,∞)
be the stochastic timepath of wealth starting at xs when the consumption function is c;10 and
suppose that u :( 0 ,∞) → R is a utility function which takes consumption as its argument.
Then the preferences of self s are given by
Es
hR ∞























10T h en o i s ei nt h ea s s e tr e t u r n se n s u r e st h a tt h ed y n a m i c sa r euniquely soluble from all initial wealth
levels for a very wide class of consumption functions. Indeed, suppose that we begin with a Borel measurable
function c :( 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) that is locally integrable in (0,∞). Then, for any x0 ∈ (0,∞), the dynamics are
uniquely soluble up to the ﬁrst time that x hits 0. The only question is therefore what happens when x0 =0 .
In order to answer this question, let G be the ﬁrst hitting time of 0. (It is entirely possible that G = ∞,i n
which case x need not go anywhere near 0.) Then there are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases.
In the ﬁrst case, liminft→G− x(t)=∞ with probability one for all x0 ∈ (0,∞).I nt h i sc a s ew ea r ef r e et o
pick any c(0) ∈ (0,y].F o rc(0) ∈ (0,y), the dynamics will be uniquely soluble starting at 0.T h i ss o l u t i o n
will have the property that x(t) > 0 for all t>0, and it will be independent of the exact choice of c(0).
For c(0) = y, the dynamics will have a continuum of solutions. At one extreme, x(t) > 0 for all t>0.I n
this case, the solution coincides with that obtained when c(0) ∈ (0,y).A tt h eo t h e re x t r e m e ,x(t)=0for
all t ≥ 0. In between, there will be an exponentially distributed time H such that x(t)=0for t ≤ H and
x(t) > 0 for t>H . In the second case, liminft→G− x(t)=0with probability one for all x0 ∈ (0,∞).I nt h i s
case we are compelled to put c(0) = y if we want the dynamics to have a solution at all. The ﬁrst case can
be thought of as the case of certain accumulation.I nt h i sc a s e ,i tm a k e ss e n s et or e q u i r et h a tc(0) <y .T h e
second case can be thought of as the case of possible decumulation. In this case, it makes sense to require
that c(0) = y. Indeed, with these conventions, the dynamics are uniquely soluble for all initial wealth levels.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 11













The continuation-value function v discounts utility ﬂows by the standard exponential dis-
count factor. The current-value function w discounts utility ﬂows up to the stochastic tran-
sition time τ by the standard exponential discount factor, and it discounts the continuation-
value obtained at τ by the composite discount factor βδ
τ. The component β reﬂects the
one-time discounting that arises from the transition from the present to the future. The
component δ
τ reﬂects standard exponential discounting.
3.3. Equilibrium. Using the notation from the previous subsection, we deﬁne equilib-
rium as follows.11
Deﬁnition 1. A consumption function c is an equilibrium of the ﬁnite-λ model iﬀ:








where e x :[ 0 ,∞) → [0,∞) is the stochastic timepath of wealth starting at x0 when the
consumption function is e c.
2. For all x0 ∈ [0,∞),w eh a v ev(x0) ≥ 1
γ u(y).
The ﬁrst condition in this deﬁnition of equilibrium reﬂects the fact that the current self
maintains control of consumption for the duration of the present – i.e., until the next sto-
chastic transition date τ periods in the future. It could be summarized by saying that, if
all future players use the consumption function c then, for all initial wealth levels x0,t h e
consumption function c is itself a best response for the current self. The second condition,
which is purely technical, requires that equilibrium continuation-payoﬀ f u n c t i o n sb eb o u n d e d
11Our equilibrium concept is essentially perfect equilibrium in stationary Markov strategies. However, we
depart from the usual deﬁnition in only allowing deviations to stationary Markov strategies. (The standard
deﬁnition allows deviations to arbitrary non-stationary and history-dependent strategies.) We do this for
expositional convenience. (It should be intuitively clear that the set of equilibria is unaﬀected.)INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 12
below by the payoﬀ function associated with the myopic policy “always consume determin-
istic labor income y”. This requirement rules out equilibria supported by policy functions
that generate expected utility of −∞.S u c h i n ﬁnitely bad policy functions can technically
be equilibria since no single self has an incentive to deviate.12
3.4. Characterization of Equilibrium. In this section we give a heuristic derivation
of the Bellman system for our problem. There are three parts to this Bellman system: an
equation for the continuation-value function of the current self, an equation for the current-
value function of the current self, and an instantaneous optimality condition determining
the consumption chosen by the current self. Our derivation can be made rigorous in the
standard way.
We begin with the equation for the continuation-value function v. Suppose that the
current state is x.T h e nv(x) has two components, namely the current payoﬀ u(c(x))dt and




−γd tv(x + dx)
¤
.















v(x + dx) − v(x)
¤







(cf. Itô’s Lemma). Hence, dividing through by dt, letting dt → 0 and suppressing the
dependence of v and c on x,w eo b t a i n






The term γvrepresents the expected value of instantaneous changes in v arising from expo-
nential discounting at rate γ;t h et e r mu(c) is the ﬂow of utility derived from the consumption
12It may be possible to replace the second condition by the weaker requirement that there exists η ∈ (0,y)
such that, for all x0 ∈ [0,∞),w eh a v ev(x0) ≥ 1
γ u(η).INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 13
c;t h et e r m(µx+ y − c)v0 is the expected value of instantaneous changes in v arising from
the deterministic component of the returns process; and the term 1
2 σ2 x2 v00 is the expected
value of instantaneous changes in v arising from the stochastic component of the returns
process.
Next, we derive the equation for the current-value function w. The derivation is analogous
to that of the equation for the continuation-value function v. Suppose that the current
state is x. Then we can decompose w(x) i n t oac u r r e n tp a y o ﬀ a n da ne x p e c t e dd i s c o u n t e d
continuation payoﬀ. The current payoﬀ is u(c(x))dt as before; but the continuation payoﬀ
now depends on whether the transition between the present and the future occurs or not. If
this transition does not occur, then the continuation value is w(x+dx). If the transition does
occur, the continuation value is βv(x + dx). Since the probabilities of these two outcomes
are e−λdt and 1−e−λdt respectively, and since the transition is independent of the evolution











−γd tβv(x + dx)
¤
.
Proceeding as in the derivation of the equation for v,13 we therefore obtain





00 + λ(βv− w). (3)
The only diﬀerence between equation (3) and equation (2) is that equation (3) contains the
additional term λ(βv−w). This term is the expected value of the instantaneous change in
w arising from the stochastic arrival, with hazard rate λ, of a transition between the present,
with current value w, and the future, with continuation value βv.
Finally, we derive an equation for the consumption function c. Suppose that the current
state is x. Then consumption is chosen by the current self to maximize the sum of her














−γd tβv(x + de x)
¤ª
,
13Speciﬁcally: multiply through by eγd t; subtract w(x) from both sides; note that
βv(x + dx) − w(x)=β (v(x + dx) − v(x)) + βv(x) − w(x);e x p a n deγd t, e−λdt, E[w(x + dx) − w(x)] and
E[v(x+dx)−v(x)]; rearrange; divide through by dt;l e tdt → 0; and suppress the dependence of v, w and c
on x!INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 14
where
de x =( µx+ y − e c)dt + σxd z.
Proceeding as in the derivation of the equation for w,14 we therefore obtain
c =a r g m a x
e c
©





00 + λ(βv− w)
ª
.
However, in the present case we can simplify further: the objective is unaﬀected if we subtract
oﬀ all the terms that do not depend on e c. We therefore arrive at
c =a r g m a x
e c
{u(e c) −e cw
0}.









when x =0 , since in this case c ≤ y. In other words, when x>0, consumption is chosen
so as to equate the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal value of wealth in the
hands of the current self (as measured by the current-value function w); and, when x =0 ,
consumption is chosen so as to equate the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal
value of wealth in the hands of the current self, or to u0(y), whichever is the higher.
Combining equations (2-5), we arrive at the following deﬁnition:






00 +( µx+ y − c)v





00 +( µx+ y − c)w
0 − γw+ u(c)+λ(βv− w) (7)
14The key point to note is that the objective is unaﬀected by the positive aﬃne transformations involved
in the derivation of the equation for w, namely multiplying by eγd t, subtracting w(x) and dividing by dt.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 15





max{w0,u 0(y)} if x =0
)
. (8)
3.5. Equilibrium in the Alternative Model. In this section, we deﬁne equilibrium in,
and describe the Bellman system of, the alternative model in which the stochastic discount
function D of the ﬁnite-λ model is replaced by the deterministic discount function D.T h e
reader who is not interested in the alternative model may wish to jump immediately to the
next section.
Suppose that c :[ 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) is a consumption function. Then we may deﬁne a






where x :[ s,∞) → [0,∞) is the timepath of wealth starting at xs when the consumption
function is c.15 The value function Z disregards utility ﬂows prior to time s,a n di td i s c o u n t s
utility ﬂows from time s onwards back to time 0 using the discount factor D(s).I tc a nb e
thought of as the value to self 0 of self s having wealth xs. More generally, given that the
model is stationary, it can be thought of as the value to self t of self t +s having wealth xs.
Arguing along the same lines as in Section 3.4 above, it can be shown that Z satisﬁes












where we have suppressed the dependence of Z on s and x, the dependence of D on s and















In other words, when x>0, consumption is chosen so as to equate the marginal utility
of consumption to the marginal value of wealth in the hands of self 0;a n d ,w h e nx =0 ,
consumption is chosen so as to equate the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal
15As explained in footnote 10 above, the dynamics are soluble for a very wide class of consumption
functions.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 16
value of wealth in the hands of self 0,o rt ou0(y), whichever is the higher.
These considerations motivate the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3. A consumption function c is an equilibrium of the alternative model iﬀ:












2. For all s,x ∈ [0,∞), Z(s,x) ≥
R ∞
s D(t)u(y)dt.
In other words, while the deﬁnition of equilibrium in the ﬁnite-λ model involves a full
optimality condition and a lower bound on the value function, the deﬁnition of equilibrium
in the alternative model involves an instantaneous optimality condition and a lower bound
on the value function.



























In other words, while the deﬁnition of the Bellman system of the ﬁnite-λ model involves
a pair of ordinary diﬀerential equations and an instantaneous optimality condition, the deﬁ-
nition of the Bellman system of the alternative model involves a partial diﬀerential equation
and an instantaneous optimality condition.
F i n a l l y ,r e c a l lt h a tD(s)=e−λse−γs+( 1− e−λs)βe −γs. (We have not used this fact in
arriving at Deﬁnitions 3 and 4, which are valid for all discount functions.) Using this, it is











We can therefore exploit the characterization of equilibrium in the ﬁnite-λ model in terms
of the Bellman system of the ﬁnite-λ model to see that c is an equilibrium of the ﬁnite-λ
model if and only if it is an equilibrium of the alternative model.16
4. The Instantaneous-Gratification Model
The continuous-time consumption model presented in the last subsection has an immedi-
ate advantage over its discrete-time analogue: in the continuous-time model equilibrium
consumption functions are everywhere continuous. However, the principal pathology of the
discrete-time hyperbolic consumption model remains: there may be intervals on which the
consumption function is downward sloping.17
Fortunately, we need not focus on the general case of the model. The urge for instant
gratiﬁcation suggests that the present – i.e. the interval [t,t+τ) during which consumption
is highly valued – is very short. Since the arrival rate of τ is λ, this is the same as saying
that λ is very large. We are therefore led to consider the limiting case λ →∞ , which serves
as a proxy for the case where τ is small. We refer to the limiting case as the instantaneous-
gratiﬁcation case, or IG case for short.
Suppose that the triple (vλ,w λ,c λ) solves the Bellman system of the ﬁnite-λ model.






00 +( µx+ y − c)v
0 − γv+ u(c). (11)
In other words, v is the expected present discounted value obtained when the discount rate is
γ, and when consumption is chosen according to the exogenously given consumption function
c. Next, dividing equation (7) through by λ and rearranging, we obtain








λ +( µx+ y − cλ)w
0
λ − γw λ + u(cλ)
¢
.
Hence, letting λ →∞ ,
w − βv=0 . (12)
16As far as the lower bound on the value functions is concerned, if v(x) ≥ 1
γ u(y) then, since the current
self can always choose c = y,w em u s th a v ew(x) ≥
γ+λβ
γ (γ+λ) u(y). Combining these two inequalities, we obtain
Z(s,x) ≥
R ∞
s D(t)u(y)dt.C o n v e r s e l y ,i fZ(s,x) ≥
R ∞
s D(t)u(y)dt then, multiplying both sides by eγs and
letting s →∞ ,w eo b t a i nv(x) ≥ 1
γ u(y).
17The jumps that can occur in equilibrium consumption functions of the discrete-time model are always
downward. As such, they are simply mathematically extreme versions of downward slopes. The Brownian
noise in the continuous-time model eliminates the mathematical pathology of jumps, but fails to eliminate
the economic pathology of downward slopes.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 18
This reﬂects the fact that, as λ →∞ , the discount function drops essentially immediately
to a fraction β of its initial value, and that the current-value function w is therefore β times





max{w0,u 0(y)} if x =0
)
. (13)
In other words, when x>0, consumption is chosen so as to equate the marginal utility of
consumption to the marginal value of wealth in the hands of the current self (as measured by
the current-value function w); and, when x =0 , consumption is chosen so as to equate the
marginal utility of consumption to the marginal value of wealth in the hands of the current
self, or to u0(y), whichever is the higher.
This derivation motivates the following deﬁnition:






00 +( µx+ y − c)v
0 − γv+ u(c), (14)




βv 0 if x>0
max{βv 0,u 0(y)} if x =0
)
. (15)
Equation (14) is identical to equation (11). Equation (15) is obtained by substituting
for w in terms of v using equation (12), (i.e. by replacing w with βv). Notice that, in the
special case in which β =1 , the Bellman system of the IG model is precisely the Bellman
system of an exponential consumer with utility function u and discount rate γ.
5. Bellman-Equation Equivalence
In the present section, we show that there exists a new utility function b u such that the
Bellman equation of the IG consumer with the original utility function u is identical to the
Bellman equation of the exponential consumer with utility function b u. We refer to this
new consumer as the b u-consumer. Bellman-equation equivalence (between the IG consumer
and the b u-consumer) is the key argument in our existence and uniqueness proofs for the IG
equilibrium (see Section 6).
The current section sets out the technical assumptions of the paper, develops many of theINSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 19
important technical lemmas, and includes the discussion of convex duality that motivates
our construction of the b u utility function. Some readers may nonetheless wish to skip to
Section 6, since the important existence, uniqueness and characterization theorems that can
be established using the background machinery developed in the current section can all be
found in that section and in Section 7. Doing so will not result in any loss of continuity.
5.1. Assumptions. We shall need the following assumptions:
A1 u :( 0 ,∞) → R is three times continuously diﬀerentiable;
A2 u0(c) > 0 for all c>0;
A3 there exist 0 <ρ≤ ρ<∞ such that ρ ≤
−cu 00(c)
u0(c) ≤ ρ for all c>0;
A4 there exist −∞ <π≤ π<∞ such that π ≤
−cu 000(c)
u00(c) ≤ π for all c>0;
A5 β + ρ − 1 > 0;
A6 (2 − β)ρ − (1 − β)π>0;
A7 γ>maxρ∈[ρb u,ρb u](1 − ρ)(µ − 1
2 ρσ2),w h e r e
ρb u =
(β + ρ − 1)ρ
(2 − β)ρ − (1 − β)π
and ρb u =
(β + ρ − 1)ρ
(2 − β)ρ − (1 − β)π
.
Assumption A1 is needed for technical reasons. Assumption A2 means that marginal utility
is strictly positive. Assumption A3 means that the relative risk aversion of the consumer may
vary with consumption, but is globally bounded. This can be expressed by saying that the
consumer has bounded relative risk aversion, or BRRA for short. Analogously, assumption
A4 means that the consumer has bounded relative prudence (cf. Kimball 1990), or BRP for
short. Assumptions A5 and A6 ensure that the dynamic inconsistency of the IG consumer
(as measured by 1−β) is not too great relative to the bounds on ρ and π.18 Taken together,
they ensure that we can construct a utility function b u with the necessary properties. When
they are not satisﬁed, it may happen that the equilibrium consumption rate is inﬁnite. In
18It is easy to see that Assumption A5 can be written in the form 1 − β<ρ . Moreover it can be shown
that, if π<ρ , then Assumption A6 can be written in the form 1−β>−
ρ
ρ−π;a n d ,i fπ>ρ , then Assumption
A6 can be written in the form 1 − β<
ρ
π−ρ.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 20
other words, the current self may consume all the wealth in a single lump-sum binge, forcing
future selves to the subsistence level of consumption.19 Assumption A7 ensures that the
discount rate γ exceeds the rate of growth of the utility of wealth when wealth grows at the
risk-adjusted rate of return µ − 1
2 ρσ2. It thereby guarantees that expected utility is well
deﬁned.20
Assumptions A1-A7 simplify dramatically if the consumer has constant relative risk aver-
sion ρ.I nt h a tc a s ew eh a v eρ = ρ = ρ, π = π = ρ+1and ρb u = ρb u = ρ. Hence Assumptions
A1-A7 reduce to:
B1 ρ>0;
B2 β + ρ − 1 > 0;
B3 γ>(1 − ρ)(µ − 1
2 ρσ2).
Assumption B1 means that the utility function is strictly concave. Assumption B2 ensures
that the dynamic inconsistency of the IG consumer (as measured by 1 − β)i sn o tt o o
great relative to the relevant parameter of the utility function (namely ρ). This assumption
would be satisﬁed in a standard calibration: empirical estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion ρ typically lie between 1
2 and 5; and the short-run discount factor β is typically
thought to lie between 1
2 and 1.21 However, for completeness, we discuss the case β+ρ−1 < 0
in Section 8.2. Assumption B3 ensures that the discount rate γ exceeds the rate of growth
of the utility of wealth when wealth grows at the risk-adjusted rate of return µ − 1
2 ρσ2.
5.2. The Bellman Equation of the IG Consumer. The Bellman equation of the IG
consumer is simply the equation obtained by eliminating c from the Bellman system of the
IG consumer. In order to derive this equation, let the functions f+ :( 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) and
19As u ﬃcient condition for this to occur is that Assumptions A5 and A6 are strongly reversed, in the sense
that β + ρ − 1 < 0 and (2 − β)ρ − (1 − β)π < 0. See Section 8.2 below.
20There are really only two cases involved here. In the ﬁrst case, ρ<1. In this case, the utility function
is unbounded above. Expected utility could therefore be positively inﬁnite if the risk-adjusted rate of return
is large and positive. Requiring that γ is large enough compensates for the potentially rapid increase in
utility. In the second case, ρ>1. In this case, the utility function is unbounded below. Expected utility
could therefore be negatively inﬁnite if the risk-adjusted rate of return is large and negative. Requiring that
γ is large enough compensates for the potentially rapid decrease in utility. In the presence of labor income
y, this second case should not arise. So Assumption A7 can probably be dispensed with in this case.
21See Laibson et al (1998) and Ainslie (1992).INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 21






In other words, let f+(φ) be the consumption chosen by an exponential consumer who is not
liquidity constrained (x>0) and who has marginal value of wealth φ;a n dl e tb ef0(φ) be
the consumption chosen by an exponential consumer who is liquidity constrained (x =0 )
and who has marginal value of wealth φ.T h e nf+(βφ ) is the consumption chosen by an IG
consumer who is not liquidity constrained and who has marginal continuation-value of wealth
φ;a n df0(βφ ) is the consumption chosen by an IG consumer who is liquidity constrained
and who has marginal continuation-value of wealth φ.
Furthermore, let the functions h+ :( 0 ,∞) → R and h0 :( −∞,∞) → R be deﬁned by
the formulae
h+(φ)=u(f+(βφ )) − φf +(βφ ),
h0(φ)=u(f0(βφ )) − φf 0(βφ ).
In other words, let h+(φ) be the ﬂow utility of consumption u(f+(βφ )), less the ﬂow cost
of spending down wealth f+(βφ )φ, for an agent who is not liquidity constrained. Similarly,
let h0(φ) be the ﬂow utility of consumption u(f0(βφ )),l e s st h eﬂow cost of spending down
wealth f0(βφ )φ, for an agent who is liquidity constrained. Notice that, in both cases,
the ﬂow cost of spending down wealth is evaluated using the marginal continuation-value
of wealth, not the marginal current-value of wealth: we are evaluating the impact of the
consumption decisions of future selves on the current self.
Then, using f+ to eliminate c from equations (14-15), and taking advantage of the nota-





00 +( µx+ y − c)v





00 +( µx+ y)v






00 +( µx+ y)v








00 +( µx+ y)v
0 − γv+ h+(v
0). (16)
Similarly, using f0 to eliminate c from equation (14-15), and taking advantage of the notationINSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 22
h0,w eo b t a i n
0=yv
0 − γv+ h0(v
0). (17)
Equation (16), with boundary condition (17), is the Bellman equation of the IG consumer.
5.3. The Idea Behind Value-Function Equivalence. Consider a second consumer
w h oi si d e n t i c a lt ot h eI Gc o n s u m e re x c e p tt h a ts h eh a s :( i )u t i l i t yf u n c t i o ne u instead of u;
and (ii) present bias 1/e β =1instead of 1/β(in other words, she is dynamically consistent).
Call this consumer the e u-consumer.
Let e h+ and e h0 be the analogues, for the e u-consumer, of the functions h+ and h0. Then,





00 +( µx+ y)e v
0 − γ e v +e h+(e v
0) (18)
with boundary condition (at x =0 )
0=y e v
0 − γ e v +e h0(e v
0). (19)
Comparing equations (18-19) with equations (16-17), we see that the only diﬀerence between
the Bellman equation of the e u-consumer and the Bellman equation of the IG consumer is
that the former involves the functions e h+ and e h0, whereas the latter involves the functions
h+ and h0.
What we would like to do, then, is to choose e u in such a way that e h+ = h+ and e h0 = h0.
For then the Bellman equations of the two consumers are identical, and hence their solutions
e v and v coincide. Unfortunately, this is not possible: we can choose e u in such a way that
e h+ = h+,o rw ec a nc h o o s ee u in such a way that e h0 = h0, but we cannot choose e u in such a
way that both e h+ = h+ and e h0 = h0. Fortunately, we can get around this problem. Let b u+
be the choice of e u for which e h+ = h+;l e tb u0 be the choice of e u for which e h0 = h0;a n dl e tb u be
the wealth-dependent utility function that coincides with b u+ when x>0 and with b u0 when
x =0 . Then – as we shall explain in more detail in the following sections – the Bellman
equation of the b u-consumer is identical to the Bellman equation of the IG consumer.
5.4. The Bellman Equation of the b u-Consumer. In order to make the idea of Section
5.3 precise, begin from a pair of utility functions b u+ :( 0 ,∞) → R and b u0 :( 0 ,y] → R.D e ﬁneINSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 23
the wealth-dependent utility function b u by the formula
b u(x,c) ≡
(
b u+(c) if x>0 and c ∈ (0,∞)
b u0(c) if x =0and c ∈ (0,y]
)
.
Consider the exponential consumer with utility function b u and discount rate γ.C a l l t h i s
consumer the b u-consumer.
Arguing as in Section 3.4 above, it is easy to see that the value function b v of the b u-
consumer satisﬁes the equation






00 +( µx+ y − c)b v
0 − γ b v + b u+(c) (20)
with boundary condition (at x =0 )
0=m a x
c∈(0,y]
(y − c)b v
0 − γ b v + b u0(c). (21)
Deﬁne the functions b h+ :( 0 ,∞) → R and b h0 :( −∞,∞) → R by the formulae
b h+(φ)= m a x
c∈(0,∞)
b u+(c) − φc,
b h0(φ)=m a x
c∈(0,y]
b u0(c) − φc.





00 +( µx+ y)b v
0 − γ b v +b h+(b v
0) (22)
with boundary condition (at x =0 )
0=y b v
0 − γ b v +b h0(b v
0). (23)
Equation (22) with boundary condition (23) is the Bellman equation of the b u-consumer.
Comparing equations (22-23) with equations (16-17), we can see that the only diﬀerence be-
t w e e nt h eB e l l m a ne q u a t i o no ft h eb u-consumer and the Bellman equation of the IG consumer
is that the former involves the functions b h+ and b h0, whereas the latter involves the functions
h+ and h0.22
22The diﬀerence between the Bellman equation of the e u-consumer and the Bellman equation of the b u-INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 24
5.5. Choosing b u+. We need to choose b u+ in such a way that b h+ = h+.T o t h i s e n d ,
recall that b h+ is deﬁned by the formula
b h+(φ)= m a x
c∈(0,∞)
b u+(c) − φc.
In other words, b h+ is the dual – in the sense of convex analysis – of b u+. In order to ensure
that b h+ = h+, it therefore suﬃces to let b u+ be the dual of h+. In other words, it suﬃces to
deﬁne b u+ :( 0 ,∞) → R by the formula
b u+(c)= m i n
φ∈(0,∞)
h+(φ)+cφ. (24)
For then b h+ i st h ed o u b l ed u a lo fh+, and therefore equal to h+.
In order to verify that this approach works, we need three lemmas.
Lemma 6. We have:
1. h+ :( 0 ,∞) → R is twice continuously diﬀerentiable;
2. h0









b u for all φ ∈ (0,∞).
In particular: h+ is strictly decreasing and strictly convex; h0
+(φ) →− ∞as φ → 0+;
h0
+(φ) → 0 as φ →∞ − ;a n dh+ is BRRA.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Remark 7. It is Assumption A5 which ensures that h0
+ < 0, and Assumption A6 which
ensures that h00
+ > 0.
Lemma 8. We have:
1. b u+ :( 0 ,∞) → R is twice continuously diﬀerentiable;
2. b u0
+(c) > 0 for all c ∈ (0,∞);




+(c) ≤ ρb u for all c ∈ (0,∞).
consumer is that e h+ and e h0 are derived from the same wealth-independent utility function e u,w h e r e a sb h+
and b h0 are derived from two diﬀerent wealth-independent utility functions b u+ and b u0.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 25
In particular: the dual b u+ of h+ is strictly increasing and strictly concave; b u0
+(c) →∞
as c → 0+; b u0
+(c) → 0 as c →∞ − ;a n db u+ is BRRA.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Remark 9. Because the slope of h+ lies in the interval (−∞,0), b u+(c) is well deﬁned if and
only if c ∈ (0,∞).
Finally, we have:
Lemma 10. Suppose that b u+ is deﬁned by the formula (24). Then b h+ = h+.
Proof. As implied in the text, this is an instance of Fenchel’s convex-duality Theorem.
(Cf Rockafellar 1970, Section 31.)
5.6. Choosing b u0. We also need to choose b u0 in such a way that b h0 = h0. We proceed
exactly as in Section 5.5. We recall that b h0 is deﬁned by the formula
b h0(φ)=m a x
c∈(0,y]
b u0(c) − φc.
In other words, b h0 is the dual of b u0. We therefore deﬁne b u0 :( 0 ,y] → R by the formula
b u0(c)= m i n
φ∈(−∞,∞)
h0(φ)+cφ. (25)
In other words, we take b u0 to be the dual of h0.F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a tb h0 is then the double
dual of h0, and therefore equal to h0.
In order to verify that this approach works, we again need three lemmas.
Lemma 11. We have:
h0(φ)=
(



































; and there is a non-negative jump in the slope of h0 at 1
β u0(y). In particular,
h0 is strictly decreasing and convex.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 26
Remark 12. There is a strictly positive jump in the slope of h0 at 1
β u0(y) if and only if
β<1.
Lemma 13. We have
b u0(c)=
(
b u+(c) if c ∈ (0,ψ(y)y]
b u+(ψ(y)y)+( c − ψ(y)y)b u0





β + ρ(y) − 1
ρ(y)
∈ (0,1)
and ρ(y)=−yu 00(y)/u 0(y).M o r e o v e rb u0(y)=u(y).
In other words: b u0 coincides with b u+ on (0,ψ(y)y]; b u0 is aﬃne on [ψ(y)y,y] with slope
b u0
+(ψ(y)y);a n db u0 coincides with u at y.I np a r t i c u l a r ,b u0 is strictly increasing and concave.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Remark 14. Because the slope of h0 lies in the interval [−y,0), b u0(c) is well deﬁned if and
only if c ∈ (0,y].
Finally, we have:
Lemma 15. Suppose that b u+ is deﬁned by the formula (25). Then b h0 = h0.
Proof. As implied in the text, this is an instance of Fenchel’s convex-duality Theorem.
(Cf Rockafellar 1970, Section 31.)
Remark 16. The b u-consumer can be thought of as a consumer who has utility function b u+,
but who receives a utility boost if x =0and c ∈ (ψ(y)y,y].
6. Existence and Uniqueness
Recall that in Section 5 we constructed a utility function b u such that a consumer with this
utility function and exponential discount rate γ will have exactly the same Bellman equation
as the IG consumer (with utility function u, exponential discount rate γ and present bias
1/β). This utility function had to be wealth-contingent: b u = b u0 when x =0 ,a n db u = b u+
when x>0. The following theorem draws together the ﬁndings relating the Bellman equation
associated with the IG model and the Bellman equation associated with the (dynamically
consistent) b u-consumer.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 27
Theorem 17 [Bellman-Equation Equivalence]. The Bellman equation of the IG consumer
is identical to the Bellman equation of the b u-consumer.
Proof. Let the functions h+ :( 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) and h0 :( −∞,∞) → (0,∞) be deﬁned
as in Section 5.2. Let the functions b u+ :( 0 ,∞) → R and b u0 :( 0 ,y] → R be the convex
duals of h+ and h0, as in Sections 5.5 and 5.6. Let the functions b h+ :( 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) and
b h0 :( −∞,∞) → (0,∞) be the convex duals of b u+ and b u0,a si nS e c t i o n5 . 4 .T h e nb h+ = h+
and b h0 = h0, by Lemmas 10 and 15. In particular, the Bellman equation of the IG consumer
is identical to the Bellman equation of the b u-consumer.
Armed with Bellman-equation equivalence, it is easy to prove the key theorem of this
section. This theorem exploits the fact that any property of the Bellman equation of the b u-
consumer must also hold for the Bellman equation of the IG consumer, since the two Bellman
equations coincide. In particular, many good properties of the dynamically-consistent opti-
mization problem of the b u-consumer all carry over to the dynamically-inconsistent problem
of the IG consumer.
Theorem 18. The IG model has a unique equilibrium. Moreover the equilibrium value
function of the IG consumer coincides with the value function of the b u-consumer.
Proof. Since the problem of the b u-consumer is a standard optimization problem, the
Bellman equation of the b u-consumer has a unique solution b v. This solution must also be a
solution of the Bellman equation of the IG consumer. That is, equilibrium exists in the IG
problem. On the other hand, any solution v of the Bellman equation of the IG consumer is
also a solution of the Bellman equation of the b u-consumer. Since b v is the unique solution of
the Bellman equation of the b u-consumer, we must have v = b v. In particular, the equilibrium
value function of the IG consumer is unique.
This is undoubtedly a powerful result. It means that we can reduce the study of the
problem of the IG consumer, which is game-theoretic in nature, to the study of the problem
of the b u-consumer, which is decision-theoretic in nature. However, it must be used with
care. Although the two consumers share a common value function, they do not share a
common consumption function. In particular, value-function equivalence does not translate
into observational equivalence. Instead, consumption of the IG consumer will generally
exceed consumption of the b u-consumer, a point that we develop in Section 7.2.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 28
6.1. The Utility Functions of the Two Consumers. In this section, we characterize
the relationship between the utility function u of the IG consumer and the utility function
b u of the b u-consumer.
Consider the perspective of a consumer with utility function u who discounts exponen-
tially with discount rate γ and is forced to adopt the (ineﬃcient) equilibrium consumption
levels of the IG consumer. Note that the value function v is constructed from exactly this
perspective: v represents the integral of exponentially discounted expected utility ﬂows that
would be experienced by a consumer with utility function u who was forced to implement
the IG consumption rule.
Now consider the perspective of the b u-consumer. By construction, the value function
b v represents the exponentially discounted integral of expected utility ﬂows that would be
experienced by the b u-consumer who implements her optimal policy.
Suppose (counterfactually) that b u were equal to u. Then b v>v ,since b v is based on the
optimal policy for b u, while v is based on the suboptimal (IG) policy for u. Of course b v>v
is a contradiction, since b u was constructed so that b v = v.
This reasoning suggests that b u must be less than u. Intuitively, since b v = v, the utility
function b u must be less than the utility function u to compensate for the fact that the policy
that supports b v is chosen optimally while the policy that supports v is suboptimal.
The following two lemmas conﬁrm this intuition.
Lemma 19. b u+(c) <u (c) for all c ∈ (0,∞).
Intuitively speaking, the IG consumption function exhibits overconsumption whenever
x>0. Hence u(c) must be strictly larger than b u+(c) to compensate.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Lemma 20. b u0(c) ≤ u(c) for all c ∈ (0,y], with equality if and only if c = y.
Intuitively speaking, the IG consumption function exhibits overconsumption when x =0
and c<y . Hence u(c) must be strictly larger than b u0(c) when c<y .
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
6.2. The Case in which u is CRRA. When u has constant relative risk aversion, we
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Moreover ψ ∈ (0,1),s i n c eβ<1 and β + ρ − 1 > 0.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,t h eb u-consumer can
be thought of as an exponential consumer who has utility function
ψρ
β u and discount rate γ,
but who receives a utility boost if x =0and c ∈ (ψy,y].24 Figure 4 depicts u, b u+ and b u0 in
the case β =0 .7 and ρ =2 . Among other things, it conﬁrms the relationship among u, b u+
and b u0 predicted by Lemmas 19 and 20.
7. Some Features of Consumption in the IG Model
In the present section, we investigate the IG model in more detail. We establish the continuity
of the consumption function in the interior of the wealth space, we establish a suﬃcient
condition for the monotonicity of the consumption function, and we derive a generalized
Euler equation governing the evolution of the marginal utility of consumption. Assumptions
A1-A7 will be in force throughout the section.
7.1. Continuity of the Consumption Function. Let v be the value function of the IG
consumer, and let c be her consumption function. When x>0, there is non-trivial Wiener
noise. Hence v0 must be continuous. Moreover u is strictly concave. Hence c is uniquely
determined by the ﬁrst-order condition u0(c)=βv 0,a n dc inherits continuity from v0.
The only remaining question is therefore whether c is continuous at x =0 ,t h ep o i n t
where the liquidity constraint binds.25 The answer to this question depends on the discount
rate γ. There is a critical value γ1 of γ such that: if γ<γ 1,t h e nc(0) <y ; and, if γ>γ 1,
then c(0) = y. In other words: if the IG consumer is patient, then she chooses to save




β has no behavioral implications. The b u-consumer therefore diﬀers from a standard
exponential consumer with utility function u and discount rate γ only inasmuch as she receives a utility
boost when x =0and c ∈ (ψy,y].
25Discontinuity in consumption at the moment at which the liquidity constraint starts to bind does not
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when x =0 ; and, if she is impatient, then she chooses to consume her labor income forever
when x =0 . In the case when she is patient, we have c(0) = c(0+). In other words, her
consumption behavior at x =0is simply the limiting case of her consumption behavior when
x is small but positive. However, in the case when she is impatient, we have c(0) <c (0+).
In other words, when she has a small but positive amount of wealth, she consumes at an
unsustainable rate that is sharply curtailed when she runs out of wealth.
More precisely, we have the following theorem that shows that c is always continuous
when cash-on-hand is strictly positive, but that c may be discontinuous at the moment the
liquidity constraint starts to bind.
Theorem 21. There exist γ1 ∈ (0,∞) and c ∈ (y,∞) such that:
1. if γ<γ 1,t h e nc is continuous on [0,∞);
2. if γ>γ 1,t h e nc(0) = y, c(0+) = c>yand c is continuous on (0,∞).






Equation (27) can be understood as follows. Let us refer to the moment at which wealth
runs out as the ‘crunch’. Suppose that the consumption level of the pre-crunch self is c.T h e n
the cost to the pre-crunch self of putting aside an extra dx units of wealth is u0(c)dx.O nt h e
other hand, if the post-crunch self receives a windfall consisting of an extra dx units of wealth,
then she can raise her consumption level from y to c for a length of time dt = dx/(c − y).
The beneﬁt to the post-crunch self of this increase in consumption is (u(c)−u(y))dt,a n dt h e
beneﬁt to the pre-crunch self is β (u(c)−u(y))dt. The pre-crunch self is therefore indiﬀerent
between putting aside the extra dx units of wealth and not putting them aside if and only if
u
0(c)dx = β (u(c) − u(y))dt.
Substituting for dt and dividing through by dx, we obtain equation (27).
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
7.2. Monotonicity of the Consumption Function. The analysis of Section 7.1 shows
that c is always non-decreasing at x =0 , in the sense that any jump in c at 0 must be non-
negative. The main question is therefore whether c is non-decreasing when x>0.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 31
In order to answer this question, let b c be the consumption function of the b u-consumer.
Then c and b c satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions u0(c)=βv 0 and b u0
+(b c)=v0. Multiplying the





Since u0 and b u0
+ are both strictly decreasing, it follows that c is non-decreasing if and only if
b c is non-decreasing.
Now consider the point of view of the b u-consumer. Intuitively speaking, this consumer
will be torn between two options. The ﬁrst option is to dissave, with a view to bringing
f o r w a r dt h et i m ea tw h i c hs h eb e n e ﬁts from the utility boost she obtains by consuming only
her labor income when her wealth runs out. The second option is to save, with a view to
settling into a pattern of steady wealth accumulation. The choice between these two options
can be expected to depend on both γ and x.I f γ is small, then she can be expected to
choose to save for all x;a n di fγ is large, then she can be expected to choose to dissave for
all x. However, for intermediate γ, she can be expected to be torn between the two options.
She is more likely to choose to dissave if x small, since she can run down her wealth fairly
quickly; and she is more likely to choose to save if x is large, since she can reach the pattern
of steady wealth accumulation fairly quickly. Moreover, as x increases and she makes the
transition from dissaving to saving, her average propensity to consume can be expected to
fall. If this fall is steep enough, it could cause b c itself to fall.
Insofar as these considerations relate to the monotonicity of b c, equation (28) implies that
they carry over to c.S p e c i ﬁcally, for γ small and γ large, c can be expected to be strictly
increasing; and, for intermediate γ and x, c could fall. However, insofar as they relate to
whether the b u-consumer saves or dissaves, they need not carry over. To see why note that,
if γ<γ 1, then it follows from Appendix A.1 and part 1 of Theorem 21 that
c = 1








Since, ψ(c) is less than unity as long as β<1, it follows that Naturally, when u is in the classINSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 32
of utility functions with constant relative risk aversion, then ρ(c) and ψ(c) will not depend
on c,so we can express cas an explicit function of b c
c = 1
ψ b c for all x ≥ 0.
Similarly, if γ>γ 1, then it follows from Appendix A.1 and part 2 of Theorem 21 that
c(0) = b c(0) = y,
c = 1
ψ(c) b c for all x>0.
Overall, then, c ≥ b c (with strict inequality if x>0). It follows that dissaving by the
b u-consumer translates into dissaving by the IG consumer, but that saving by the b u-consumer
need not translate into saving by the IG consumer.
The following theorem conﬁrms that, if γ is greater than the interest rate µ,t h e nc is
indeed strictly increasing. The theorem is presented as a suﬃcient condition for monotonicity.
Once we have derived the deterministic version of the IG model, it will be possible to show
that this suﬃcient condition is also necessary in the deterministic model when γ is near µ.
See Section 7.6 below.
Theorem 22. Suppose that γ ≥ µ.T h e nc0 > 0 when x>0.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
7.3. Overconsumption when u is CRRA. L e tu st a k ea so u rr e f e r e n c ep o i n tt h e
exponential consumer who has utility function
ψρ
β u and discount rate γ,b u tw h od o e sn o t
receive a utility boost at the origin. Since the factor
ψρ
β has no behavioral signiﬁcance, this
consumer is simply the standard consumer of the standard buﬀer-stock model. Call her the
reference consumer.
Now consider the b u-consumer. If γ<γ 1,t h e nb c(0) ≤ ψy. In other words, she never takes
advantage of the utility boost at x =0 . Her consumption function is therefore identical to
that of the reference consumer. If γ>γ 1,t h e nb c(0) = y. In other words, she takes full
advantage of the utility boost at x =0 . This has two consequences. First, when x =0 ,
her consumption must be at least as high as that of the reference consumer. Second, when
x>0, she will increase her consumption above that of the reference consumer, in order to
bring forward the time at which she obtains the utility boost. The consumption function ofINSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 33
the b u-consumer is therefore greater than that of the reference consumer, and strictly greater
for all x>0.
Finally, consider the IG consumer. If γ<γ 1, then it follows from the discussion of
Section 7.2 that
c = 1





In other words, c is simply a scalar multiple of b c. Similarly, if γ>γ 1,t h e n
c(0) = b c(0) = y,
and
c = 1
ψ b c for all x>0.
Overall, then, c ≥ b c (with strict inequality if x>0).
7.4. The Generalized Euler Equation. Since u0(c) may have a discontinuity at 0,w e
cannot use Itô’s Lemma to study its dynamics. We can, however, use Itô’s Lemma to study
the dynamics of m = βv 0. These dynamics are very closely related to those of u0(c). Indeed,
u0(c)=m when x>0.M o r e o v e r :
1. if c(0+) = c(0), then the dynamics of m are identical to those of u0(c);
2. if c(0+) >c (0) and x(0) ∈ (0,∞),a n di fT is the ﬁr s tt i m et h a tx hits 0, then the
dynamics of m are identical to those of u0(c) on the interval (0,T);a n d
3. if c(0+) >c (0) and x(0) = 0, then the dynamics of m are identical to those of u0(c).
The two dynamics only diﬀer if c(0+) >c (0) and x(0) ∈ (0,∞), in which case u0(c) jumps
up at T (whereas m does not jump).




















if x =0and c(0+) >c (0).
This theorem gives an exact expression for the rate of growth of m. The equation includes
deterministic terms (i.e. the terms which include dt) and a stochastic term (i.e. the ﬁnal
term, which includes dz). The stochastic term captures the negative eﬀect that positive
wealth shocks have on marginal utility.
The term γd timplies that marginal utility rises more quickly the higher the long-run
discount rate γ.T h et e r m−µdtimplies that marginal utility rises more slowly the higher
the rate of return µ.T h et e r mσ2 ρ(c) xc 0
c dt captures two separate eﬀects. First, asset income
uncertainty σ2 aﬀects the savings decision. Second, since marginal utility is non-linear in
consumption, asset income uncertainty aﬀects the average value of future marginal utility.
The net impact of these two eﬀects is always positive. The term (1 − β)c0 dt captures the
eﬀect of hyperbolic discounting. Naturally, when β =1 ,t h i se ﬀect vanishes and the model
coincides with the standard exponential discounting case.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
7.5. The Deterministic IG Model. Up to now we have assumed that the standard
deviation of asset returns σ>0. In other words, we have been focussing on the stochastic
IG model. In the present section, we investigate the case σ =0 . In other words, we focus
on the deterministic IG model. We show that, by viewing the deterministic IG model as
a limiting case of the stochastic IG model, we are able to pinpoint a unique value function
for the deterministic IG model. More precisely, we have the following theorem. The proof,
which follows standard lines, is omitted.
Theorem 24. Let vσ be the value function of the stochastic IG model. Then:
1. there is a continuous function v :[ 0 ,∞) → R such that vσ → v uniformly on compact
subsets of [0,∞) as σ → 0+;
2. v is the unique viscosity solution26 of the ordinary diﬀerential equation
0=( µx+ y)v
0 − γv+b h+(v
0) (29)
26See Crandall et al (1992) for a “user’s guide” to viscosity solutions.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 35
with boundary condition
0=yv
0 − γv+b h0(v
0) (30)
at x =0 .
Equation (29) with boundary condition (30) is the Bellman equation of the deterministic
IG model.
The equilibrium consumption function c of the deterministic IG model can be determined




βv 0 if x>0
max{βv 0,u 0(y)} if x =0
)
.
In other words, by letting σ → 0+ in the stochastic IG model, we select a unique sensible
equilibrium of the deterministic IG model.
Remark 25. Krusell and Smith (2000) consider a deterministic discrete-time hyperbolic
consumption model. They show that equilibrium is indeterminate in their model. Our
results suggest that this indeterminacy could be resolved by a reﬁnement analogous to the
o n et h a tw eh a v eu s e dh e r e .
Remark 26. The Bellman equation of the deterministic IG model is simpler than than
that of the stochastic IG model: it is a ﬁrst-order ordinary diﬀerential equation, whereas the
latter is a second-order ordinary diﬀerential equation.
7.6. The Deterministic IG Model when u is CRRA. In the present section, we
s h a l li n v e s t i g a t et h ed e t e r m i n i s t i cI Gm o d e li nt h ec a s et h a tu is CRRA. More precisely, we
shall make the following assumptions:27
C1 σ =0 ;
C2 u(c) takes the form 1
1−ρ c1−ρ with ρ 6=1 ;
C3 µ>0.
27Assumptions C1-C3 are made in addition to the standing assumptions A1-A7. The latter accordingly
reduce to Assumptions B1-B3.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 36
Under these assumptions, the Bellman equation possesses a symmetry that allows us to trans-
form it from a non-autonomous ordinary diﬀerential equation into an autonomous ordinary
diﬀerential equation. We are therefore able to provide a complete analysis of equilibrium in
this case.
Among other things, this analysis shows that there there are critical values γ1 and γ2
o ft h ed i s c o u n tr a t eγ such that, if γ<γ 1 or γ>γ 2,t h e nc is strictly increasing; and if
γ1 <γ<γ 2,t h e nc ﬁrst increases, then decreases, then increases again. Indeed, it shows
that γ1 = βµand γ2 = µ.I ta l s os h o w st h a t ,f o rγ<γ 2, the IG consumer chooses to dissave.
In particular, c exceeds b c by enough to turn saving by the b u-consumer into dissaving by the
IG consumer when γ1 <γ<γ 2.
In the deterministic IG model, total income is µx+y.I fc is the equilibrium consumption







Theorem 27. Suppose that Assumptions C1-C3 hold. Then there exists γ3 ∈ (µ,∞) such
that:
1. If γ ∈ ((1 − ρ)µ,β µ),t h e nAPC is constant and strictly less than 1.I np a r t i c u l a r ,c
is strictly increasing and aﬃne.
2. If γ ∈ (βµ ,µ ), then there exists x1 ∈ (0,∞) such that APC jumps up at 0, is strictly
decreasing and strictly greater than 1 on (0,x 1), jumps down at x1, and is constant
and strictly greater than 1 on (x1,∞).M o r e o v e rc jumps up at 0, is strictly decreasing
on (0,x 1), jumps down at x1, and is strictly increasing and aﬃne on (x1,∞).
3. If γ ∈ (µ,γ3),t h e nAPC jumps up at 0, and is strictly decreasing and strictly greater
than 1 on (0,∞).M o r e o v e rc jumps up at 0, and is strictly increasing on (0,∞).
4. If γ ∈ (γ3,∞),t h e nAPC jumps up at 0, and is strictly increasing and strictly greater
than 1 on (0,∞).M o r e o v e rc jumps up at 0, and is strictly increasing on (0,∞).
In particular, the condition γ ≥ µ used in the proof of monotonicity of the consumption
function is necessary.
Proof. See Appendix A.10INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 37
Remark 28. The analysis of this section can easily be extended to the cover the case ρ =1 .
Remark 29. There is a unique solution to the dynamics even when γ ∈ (βµ ,µ ). Indeed,
in this case we have APC > 1,a n dx therefore decreases strictly with time.
8. Derivation of the IG Model Revisited
8.1. A Limit Theorem. Our derivation of the IG model from the ﬁnite-λ model in
Section 4 was deliberately heuristic. The relationship between the two models can, however,
be made rigorous. The following theorem, which we state without proof, gives the ﬂavor of
the link between the two models.
Theorem 30. Suppose that Assumptions A1-A7 hold. Then there exists λ0 ∈ (0,∞) such
that, for all λ ∈ [λ0,∞),t h eﬁnite-λ model possesses a unique equilibrium cλ.I fwλ is the
current-value function associated with cλ,t h e nwλ is continuous on [0,∞).M o r e o v e r1
β wλ
converges uniformly on compact subsets of [0,∞) as λ →∞to a limit function v,w h i c hi s
the unique viscosity solution28 of the Bellman equation (16) for x ∈ (0,∞), with boundary
condition (17) at x =0 .
8.2. A Complementary Theorem. Theorem 30 covers the case in which u has constant
relative risk aversion ρ>1 − β. It is also possible to prove a limit theorem that covers the
case in which u has constant relative risk aversion ρ<1 − β. In order to formulate such a
theorem, we introduce the following assumptions, which complement Assumptions A5 and
A6:
A50 β + ρ − 1 < 0;
A60 (2 − β)ρ − (1 − β)π < 0.
The theorem, which we state without proof, is then as follows.
Theorem 31. Suppose that Assumptions A1-A4, A50,A 6 0 and A7 hold. Then there exists
λ0 ∈ (0,∞) such that, for all λ ∈ [λ0,∞),t h eﬁnite-λ model possesses a unique equilibrium
cλ.I fwλ is the current-value function associated with cλ,t h e nwλ is continuous on [0,∞).
Moreover 1
β wλ → 1
γ u(y) uniformly on compact subsets of [0,∞) as λ →∞ .
28See Crandall et al (1992) for a “user’s guide” to viscosity solutions.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 38
This theorem reﬂects the following behavior. For large λ, the consumer quickly consumes
all her wealth. Thereafter, she consumes her labor income. Because her utility function has
the property that 1
c u(c) → 0 as c →∞ , the initial consumption binge does not contribute
much to the expected present discounted value of her consumption ﬂow. It is the subsequent
consumption of her labor income that matters. The expected present discounted value of
this consumption is of course simply 1
γ u(y).
This behavior arises because, when ρ<1−β, the utility function is not suﬃciently bowed
to dampen the feedback eﬀects that arise in hyperbolic models. Instead, these feedback
eﬀects drive consumption to inﬁnity. In eﬀect, the current self knows that subsequent selves
are going to consume at a very high rate, and therefore chooses to consume at a very high
rate herself in order to preempt the consumption by the later selves.
8.3. A Stronger Limit Theorem. Finally, note that Theorem 30 continues to hold
when Assumptions A5 and A6 are replaced by the following, signiﬁcantly weaker, assump-
tions:
A500 β + liminfc→∞ ρ(c) − 1 > 0;
A600 (2 − β)liminfc→∞ ρ(c) − (1 − β)limsup c→∞ π(c) > 0.
These assumptions ensure that b h+ is decreasing and convex near 0. This is enough to ensure
that consumption remains bounded as λ →∞ . These assumptions are, however, consistent
with b h+ being increasing or concave away from 0. In other words, for some BRRA utility
functions, the IG problem is not value-function equivalent to any exponential consumption
problem.
9. Conclusions
We have described a continuous-time model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Our model al-
lows for a general class of preferences, includes liquidity constraints, and places no restrictions
on equilibrium policy functions. The model is also psychologically relevant. We take the
phrase ‘instantaneous gratiﬁcation’ literally. We analyze a model in which individuals prefer
gratiﬁcation in the present instant discretely more than consumption in the momentarily
delayed future. In this simple setting, equilibrium is unique and the consumption function
is continuous. When the long-run discount rate weakly exceeds the interest rate, the con-
sumption function is also monotonic. All of the pathologies that characterize discrete-time
quasi-hyperbolic models vanish.INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 39
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 6. Let the function e h+ :( 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) be deﬁned by the
formula
e h+(φ)=u(f+(φ)) − φf +(φ).
(This notation is consistent with the notation of Section 5.3 if we put e u = u.) Then:
h+(φ)=u(f+(βφ )) − f+(βφ )φ
= u(f+(βφ )) − βf +(βφ )φ − (1 − β)f+(βφ )φ






+ − (1 − β)f+ − (1 − β)βf
0
+ φ
= −βf + − (1 − β)f+ − (1 − β)βf
0
+ φ























−(β + ρ(f+) − 1)f+
ρ(f+)
where we have suppressed the dependence of e h+ and f+ on βφ . Assumption A5 therefore
implies that h0
+ < 0.
Second, in the course of the previous paragraph we showed that
h
0
+(φ)=−f+ − (1 − β)f
0






+ − (1 − β)f
0






































((2 − β)ρ(f+) − (1 − β)π(f+)).
Assumption A6 therefore implies that h00
+(φ) > 0.
Third, using the ﬁnal expressions obtained above for h0
+(φ) and h00
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A . 2 . P r o o fo fL e m m a8 . Put












































β + ρ(y) − 1
ρ(y)
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This completes the proof of the lemma.
A . 4 . P r o o fo fL e m m a1 3 . We have
h0(φ)=
(























∈ [−y,−ψy] if φ = 1
β u0(y)
= h0










b u0(c)= m i n
φ∈(−∞,∞)
h+(φ)+cφ= b u+(c)


















0(y)+( c − ψy) 1
β u
0(y)
= b u+(ψy)+( c − ψy)b u
0
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This completes the proof of the lemma.
A . 5 . P r o o fo fL e m m a1 9 . Let the function e h+ :( 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) be deﬁned by the
formula
e h+(φ)=u(f+(φ)) − φf +(φ).
(This notation is consistent with the notation of Section 5.3 if we put e u = u.) Then:
h+(φ)=u(f+(βφ )) − φf +(βφ ) <u (f+(φ)) − φf +(φ)=e h+(φ)
(by deﬁnition of h+,s i n c ef+(φ) is the unique value of c that maximizes u(c) − φcand by
deﬁnition of e h+, respectively); and hence





(by deﬁnition of b u+, because e h+ >h + and by convex duality, respectively).
A.6. Proof of Lemma 20. Let the function e h0 :( −∞,∞) → R be deﬁned by the
formula
e h0(φ)=u(f0(φ)) − φf 0(φ).
(This notation is consistent with the notation of Section 5.3 if we put e u = u.) Then
h0(φ)=u(f0(βφ )) − φf 0(βφ ) ≤ u(f0(φ)) − φf 0(φ)=e h0(φ),
with equality if and only if φ ∈ (−∞,u 0(y)). Hence




e h0(φ)+cφ= u(c).INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 45
Now, suppose that c ∈ (0,y).T h e n u(c) is attained for a φ∗ for which e h0(φ∗) >h 0(φ∗).
Hence
u(c)=e h0(φ∗)+cφ ∗ >h 0(φ∗)+cφ ∗ ≥ b u0(c).
On the other hand, if c = y then b u0(c) is attained for a φ∗ for which e h0(φ∗) >h 0(φ∗).
(Speciﬁcally, b u0(c) is attained for any φ∗ ≤ u0(y).) A fortiori, u(c) is also attained for any
such φ∗. Hence
u(c)=e h0(φ∗)+cφ ∗ = h0(φ∗)+cφ ∗ = b u0(c).
Overall, then, b u0(c)=u(c) if and only if c = y.
A.7. Proof of Theorem 21. Put φ = v0(0). Then (since v0(0) is by deﬁnition the limit
of v0(x) as x → 0)w em u s th a v eb o t h
0=yφ− γv(0) + h+(φ)
(from equation (16)) and
0=yφ− γv(0) + h0(φ).
(from equation (17)). Eliminating γv(0) between these two equations, we obtain
yφ+ h0(φ)=yφ+ h+(φ).











. The isolated solution corresponds to the case in which the consumer is
impatient, and chooses to consume her labor income at x =0 . The continuum of solutions
correspond to the case in which the consumer is patient, and chooses to save at x =0 .A t
the isolated solution, we have
γv(0) = yφ+ h0(φ)=yφ+ u(y) − φy= u(y)
(cf. Lemma 11). At a solution in the continuum, we have
γv(0) = yφ+ h+(φ).
In particular, γv(0) is strictly increasing in φ.
Next, consider the point of view of the b u-consumer. She is a standard optimizer. It isINSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 46
therefore obvious that the ﬂow equivalent γv(0) of the value to her of having x =0is non-
decreasing in γ. Moreover, there must be a critical value γ1 of her discount rate γ such that:
γv(0) is strictly decreasing in γ for γ<γ 1;a n dγv(0) is constant and equal to u(y) when






and for γ>γ 1 we will obtain the isolated solution φ = φ.
Finally, put c = f+(β φ) and consider the point of view of the IG consumer. If γ<γ 1,
then we have
c(0) = f0(βφ )=f+(βφ )=c(0+).
If γ>γ 1,t h e nw eh a v e
c(0) = f0(βφ )=y
















Hence φ is the smaller of the two solutions of the equation
u(y)=yφ+ h+(φ).
Noting that h+(φ)=u(f+(βφ )) − φf +(βφ ), making the substitution φ = 1
β u0(c) and rear-
ranging, this equation can be written in the form (27). Since u0 is strictly decreasing, c is
the larger of the two solutions of this equation.
A.8. Proof of Theorem 22. As explained in the text, it suﬃces to show that b c0 > 0
when x>0.A saﬁrst step, note that b c satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition b u0
+(b c)=v0 when
x>0. Hence b u00
+(b c)b c0 = v00. Hence b c0 > 0 if and only if v00 < 0.N e x t ,d i ﬀerentiating equation



















σ2 x2 ((γ − µ)v
0 − ((µ + σ









σ2 x2 (γ − µ)v
0 ≥ 0.
Hence, if there exists x1 ∈ (0,∞) such that v00(x1) ≥ 0,t h e nv00 ≥ 0 on (x1,∞).I n o t h e r
words, v grows at least linearly. But this is impossible. Under our standing assumptions,
there exists k1 > 0 such that b u0 and b u+ are dominated by the CRRA utility function








Moreover standard considerations show that there exists k2 > 0 such that the value function









In particular, v cannot grow linearly. Now v ≤ v,s i n c eb u0,b u+ ≤ u. Hence v cannot grow
linearly either. We must therefore have v00 < 0 on (0,∞).





00 +( µx+ y − c)m
0)dt + σxm
0 dz.





00 +( µx+ y − e c)m
0 − γm+ σ
2 xm
0 + µm− e c
0 m + βu
0(e c)e c
0 =0










00 +( µx+ y − e c)m




0 − µm+e c
0 m − βu
0(e c)e c




0 − µm+ e c
0 m − βme c
0 +( e c − c)m
0
=( γ − µ +( 1− β)e c
0)m − (σ


















































In particular, we have the ﬁrst statement of the theorem.
As for the second statement, note that if x =0and c(0+) >c (0) then c(0) = y.W e a l t h
therefore remains constant at 0 forever, m = u0(y) forever and dm =0 .
A.10. Proof of Theorem 27. We proceed in steps. First, put X =l o g ( µx+ y),
v(x)=( µx+ y)1−ρ V (X),   =l o g ( y) and, in a slight abuse of notation,
h0(φ,y)=
(














0 − γv+ h+(v
0)
(using the Bellman equation of the deterministic IG model, namely (29))
=( µx+ y)
1−ρ (µV
0 +( 1− ρ)µV − γV)+h+((µx+ y)
−ρ (µV
0 +( 1− ρ)µV))
(since v0 =( µx+ y)−ρ (µV0 +( 1− ρ)µV))
=( µx+ y)
1−ρ (µV
0 +( 1− ρ)µV − γV + h+(µV
0 +( 1− ρ)µV))
(because h+ is homogeneous of degree 1 − 1
ρ). Also
0=yv
0(0) − γv(0) + h0(v
0(0),y)
(using the boundary condition of the deterministic IG model, namely (30))
= y
1−ρ (µV
0( )+( 1− ρ)µV( ) − γV( )) + h0(y
−ρ (µV
0( )+( 1− ρ)µV( )),y)INSTANTANEOUS GRATIFICATION 49
(since v0(0) = y−ρ (µV0( )+( 1− ρ)µV( )))
= y
1−ρ (µV
0( )+( 1− ρ)µV( ) − γV( )+h0(µV
0( )+( 1− ρ)µV( ),1)).
Hence v is the value function of the deterministic IG model iﬀ V satisﬁes the Bellman
equation
0=µV
0 +( 1− ρ)µV − γV + h+(µV
0 +( 1− ρ)µV) (31)
for X ∈ ( ,∞) with boundary condition
0=µV
0 +( 1− ρ)µV − γV + h0(µV
0 +( 1− ρ)µV,1) (32)
at X =  .
Second, put ζ = µV0+(1−ρ)µV. Then equation (31) determines a curve C+ in (V 0,V)-
space parametrized by ζ ∈ (0,∞).I fρ<1, then: for ζ ∈ (0,b u0
+(1)), V 0 is increasing in ζ
and V is decreasing in ζ;a n d ,f o rζ ∈ (b u0
+(1),∞),b o t hV 0 and V are increasing in ζ.I f
ρ>1,a n di fw ep u t
a =
γ − (1 − ρ)µ
(ρ − 1)µ
> 1,
then: for ζ ∈ (0,b u0
+(a)),b o t hV 0 and V are decreasing in ζ;29 for ζ ∈ (b u0
+(a),b u0
+(1)), V 0
is increasing in ζ and V is decreasing in ζ;a n d ,f o rζ ∈ (b u0
+(1),∞),b o t hV 0 and V are
increasing in ζ.
Third, V is minimized when ζ = b u0
+(1),a tw h i c hp o i n tV = b u+(1). Hence there are two
points on C+ at which V = u(1) > b u+(1). We denote the corresponding values of ζ by b u0
+(ψ)
and b u0
+(ψ).30 It is easy to verify that
ψ =
β + ρ − 1
ρ
< 1 < ψ,
but there is no closed-form expression for ψ.
Fourth, equation (32) determines a curve C0 in (V 0,V)-space parametrized by ζ ∈
(−∞,∞).F o r ζ ∈ (−∞,b u0
+(ψ)), V 0 is increasing in ζ and V is constant and equal to
u(1);a n d ,f o rζ ∈ (b u0
+(ψ),∞), C0 coincides with C+ (in particular, both V 0 and V are
increasing in ζ).
29Since V,V 0 → 0− as ζ → 0+,w eh a v eV 0 < 0 for ζ ∈ (0,b u0
+(A)).
30The points ψ and ψ are the two solutions of the equation b u+(b c)+( 1− b c)b u0
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Fifth, there is a unique point on C+ at which V 0 =0 . We denote the corresponding value
of ζ by b u0
+(b).I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t
b =
γ − (1 − ρ)µ
ρµ
.
It can also be shown that V 0 =
γ−βµ
γµ b u0
+(ψ) when ζ = b u0
+(ψ), V 0 =
γ−µ
γµ b u0





+(ψ) when ζ = b u0
+(ψ),a n d ,i fρ>1,t h e nV 0 =
γ−(1−ρ)µ
γ (1−ρ)µ b u0
+(a) < 0 when
ζ = b u0
+(a).31
Sixth, it is easy to verify that b is increasing in γ. Moreover there exists γ3 ∈ (µ,∞) such
that: b ∈ (0,ψ) iﬀ γ ∈ ((1 − ρ)µ,β µ); b ∈ (ψ,1) iﬀ γ ∈ (βµ ,µ ); b ∈ (1,ψ) iﬀ γ ∈ (µ,γ3);
and b ∈ (ψ,∞) iﬀ γ ∈ (γ3,∞).32
Seventh, we complete the analysis of APC using a phase diagram. Equation (31) is a
ﬁrst-order autonomous ordinary diﬀerential equation. A one-dimensional phase diagram (in
V -space) would therefore appear to be appropriate. However, there may be upward jumps
in V 0.33 It is therefore preferable to work with a two-dimensional phase diagram (in (V 0,V)-
space). The phase curve corresponding to the equilibrium starts on the curve C0,i sc o n ﬁned
to the curve C+, and converges to the steady state V 0 =0as X →∞ .
Eighth, we complete the analysis of c by noting that, when x>0:t h eﬁrst-order condition
of the equivalent exponential problem gives b u00
+(b c)b c0 = v00; and the Bellman equation of the




(µx+ y)(1− [ APC)b u00
+(b c)
,
where [ APC = b c
(µx+y).
31These values of V 0 are found from the formula V 0 =
γ−(1−ρ)µ−ρµb c
γµ b u0
+(b c). The corresponding values of
V can be found from the formula V =
1−ρ+ρ b c
b c b u+(b c).







. This equation has two
solutions, αµand γ3.
33There are no downward jumps. Intuitively speaking, this is because V is the upper envelope of smooth
functions, and can therefore have convex kinks but not concave kinks.